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Once Upon a Time...When a Revolution Evolved into Civil War
Crystal Myers
ABSTRACT
This paper gives an overview of how the conflict in Syria has evolved from a revolution into a
sectarian civil war. Power is maintained by the ruling Assad family through promotion of the
Alawite minority within the government and military. Methods of persecution of the Sunni
majority by the Assad government are discussed as well as a policy of strategic expulsion of the
Sunni enclave to Idlib, a city on the outskirts of Syria (bordering Turkey).
In Syria there is a story that has been told
and retold, transforming into a prominent
legend. It is the “once upon a time” of
young boys who wanted freedom and dared
to challenge Bashar al-Assad, their despotic
president. This happened during a time
period that would become known as the
Arab Spring, a time when revolutions were
bountiful, and dreams felt as if they could
come true.
The first revolution of the Arab Spring
started in Tunisia and resulted in the ejection
of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This
initial successful revolution was observed in
other Middle Eastern countries over social
media outlets such as YouTube and
Facebook. Tunisia’s triumph gave hope to
others in the Middle East, who were living
in comparable autocratic governments and
desired similar results. People next took to
the streets in Egypt forcing President Hosni
Mubarak out of office. Libya’s leader
Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed.
Similarly, in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah
Saleh voluntarily left office. These
revolutionary displays were seen as
successes in that they resulted in leadership
changes.
For Syria, it all started in Daraa, when a
group of boys spray painted the now
familiar revolutionary slogan: “The people
want the fall of the regime,” on the side of
their school building. In some accounts there
was an additional line, “it’s your turn
doctor,” a direct jab at President Assad, who
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is an ophthalmologist. The boys were
apprehended and jailed, with protests
beginning initially by their friends and
family, demanding their release. Syrian
Security forces are known to utilize torture
in interrogations and so there was wellfounded fear of the boy’s safety within
police custody. When they were finally
released evidence of brutality spurred
demands for reform. During these
demonstrations the reaction of the
government was severe, using militant force
on its protesting civilians. Consequently,
many Syrians were arrested, injured or
killed. The initial call for reform evolved to
a demand for President Bashar al-Assad to
step down.
This is just a brief synopsis of how the
Syrian revolution initially started. This paper
itself will seek to explain how a revolution
that started with humanitarian and
democratic auspices eventually evolved into
a sectarian civil war. In order to fully
understand the ongoing conflict that is
currently active, we need to first look at the
demographics of Syria itself. Ted Galen
Carpenter appropriately described this as, “a
fragile ethno-religious tapestry that could
easily unravel” (2013, p. 1). The various
threads of Syria’s tapestry are: Sunni a little
less than sixty percent, Christians around
thirteen percent, Alawites (a Shiite sect)
about thirteen percent, Druze six percent and
Sunni ethnic minorities such as Kurds and
Armenians making up the rest (Carpenter,
2013).
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The government power dynamic within
Syria is like that of a monarchy, with the
same family ruling the country over the past
four decades. Most of the al-Assad family
hold prominent positions within the Syrian
governments. The Assad's fall into the
religious category Alawite, a sect of Shiite
Islam. Although a minority within the
overall country demographic, this group
holds majority power within the government
and Syrian military, wielding the significant
influence that comes with eighty percent
holding high positions as military officers,
and one hundred and forty thousand career
soldiers, all hailing the religious identity of
Alawite (Carpenter, 2013).
When it comes to government provision of
goods and services the Assad family utilizes
asabiya as a distribution factor. Asabiya
(Arabic:  )ﻋﺼﺒﯿّﺔrefers to the tribe/clan or in
this case the Alawite community. This can
be exemplified by the marked government
investment in the northwestern governorate
of Latakia, which has a seventy-five percent
Alawite population (De Juan & Bank, 2015).
This same mentality applies to the
distribution of electricity, a resource that
falls under jurisdiction of the government.
The Ministry of Electricity decides what
areas of Syria will or won’t receive
electricity, how much and for how long.
Syria’s grid is well known for having power
shortages with regularly scheduled
blackouts. However, these blackouts are not
distributed equally. As a result of this
dynamic the Ministry of Electricity has been
identified on the EU sanctions list for using
power as a means of repression (De Juan &
Bank, 2015).
The same could be said for the distribution
of land. Salwa Ismail conducted research on
urban space within Syria, particularly within
the Damascus area and outlying suburbs. He
discovered an intentionality by the regime to
fracture the societal identity of Syrians along
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sectarian lines (2013). Neighborhoods were
established demographically with Alawi
quarters placed in various locations as
military extensions, working for and under
the regime. A case study of this situation
looks at the Barzeh quarter and its neighbor
Ish al-Warwar. These two groups have lived
in cooperation and have even been referred
to as Barzawi, a conglomerate of the two
names (Salwa 2013). Conflict between the
two emerged when the Ish al-Warwar Alawi
residents began to suppress revolutionary
demonstrations against the Assad
government being conducted by the Barzeh
Sunni residents. The reason behind this was
that Ish al-Warwar residents had been told
the Sunni Barzawis were planning to attack
them and take their land (Salwa 2013).
It is believed that throughout the conflict
this strategy has been used by the regime to
create alienation between the various sects.
An interview with Salway Ismail, a Barzeh
resident confirmed this: “the ‘Ish people are
oppressed like us, and they are treated as
slaves, but they defend the regime because
they are made to fear their 'extremist' Sunni
neighbors” (Salwa 2013).
Salwa Ismail (2013) concludes,
Relations with the regime and the
demographic composition of quarters are
the main variables at play in the
differentiated responses to the Uprising
observed in Damascus and elsewhere. In
this complex urban configuration are
found conflicts over title to land and
position in relation to government,
conflicts inflected with sectarian
meanings. These divisions are well
illustrated by the case of the Barzeh
quarter on the northern edge of Damascus
and its relationship with the neighboring
community of ‘Ish al-Warwar (p. 883).
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Another provision of public service that has
become a strategic method of the Assad
government is the supplying of food or lack
thereof, to specific targeted areas. Jose Ciro
Martinez and Brent Eng summarize this
strategy. “The provision of bread to regimecontrolled areas has gone hand in hand with
target efforts to deprive rebel groups of the
essential foodstuff.” It is common
knowledge that many of the rebels are
Sunni. The main method utilized to achieve
this end is the bombing of bakeries. Over a
three-week period in August 2012, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) reported at least ten
aerial attacks by the government on bakeries
in Aleppo (Martinez & Eng, 2017).
A more blunt way to look at this strategy is
as a “starve or surrender” ultimatum.
Amnesty International has issued a report
condemning the Assad regime’s methods of:
“systematically preventing crucial food and
medicine supplies from entering civilian
areas while mounting bombing campaigns,
amount to war crimes,” violating
international law (Shaheen, 2017). The
aforementioned report found that the
government had restricted UN and other
humanitarian aid from entering rebel areas,
while at the same time carrying out
airstrikes on hospitals, markets, mosques
and schools, rendering vital public services
unviable (Shaheen, 2017).
Regional outside players only exacerbate the
already tense sectarian lines within Syria.
Assad has gained support of traditional
Shiite-led governments, sometimes referred
to as the “shiite axis” in the Middle East:
Iraq (Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki), Iran
(Supreme leader Ali Khamenei/President
Hassan Rouhani), and the Hezbollah, a
Shiite militia from Lebanon (Fuller 2007).
On the opposing Sunni side there are the
Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia (King
Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud) and to some
extent Egypt (President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi)
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and Jordan (King Abdullah II). While
Turkey (President Recep Tayyip Erdogan)
also tends to side in this arena, Turkey has at
other times, has maintained neutrality
between the two divisions (Fuller 2007).
International actors also play a role in this
conflict, with Russia (President Vladimir
Putin) siding with Assad, due to “long
standing economic and strategic ties” that
stem from the Cold War era (Carpenter,
2013, p. 9). It also can’t be overlooked that
Russia’s only military installation in the
Mediterranean region exists in the Syrian
port of Tartous (Carpenter, 2013). China
(President Xi Jinping) sides with Assad for
economic reasons. In 2011 Syrian exports to
China totaled over 2.4 billion, and China has
a vested interest in Syria’s oil industry
(Carpenter, 2013).
Siding with the opposition or merely against
Assad is the United States and its other
western allies. The US has taken a stance to
uphold the “responsibility to protect
doctrine” which states,
When a regime brutalizes its population
in a systematic way the international
community not only has a right but also
an obligation to intervene to protect
vulnerable civilians and if necessary,
depose an offending regime (Carpenter,
2013, p. 10).
This becomes an ideological issue when the
other two international actors (Russia and
China) are adhering to the Westphalian
system, an opposite doctrine that focuses on
prohibiting any external meddling in a
country’s internal affairs (Carpenter, 2013).
The international divide is especially
exemplified by interactions occurring at the
global level in United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) debates. The Syrian
conflict tends to be framed in terms of

3

The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research, Vol. 20 [2019], Art. 2

The Review, Volume 20 (2019)

“human rights violations and a call for
outside intervention,” by the three Western
permanent members. However, for Russia
and China it is framed as “a complex
struggle amenable to noninterventionist
solutions” (Medzihorsky, Popovic & Jenne,
2017). This ideological divide in UN policy
becomes the focus of international rhetoric
overshadowing the actual sectarian divide
that is occurring on the ground.
This sectarian divide has become so
ingrained in a war that has now lasted seven
years that even resolutions propose a
tripartite arrangement in which Syria is
effectively split between ethnic groups.
Azeem Ibrahim proposes that Assad retain
the Damascus-Aleppo corridor, that the
Kurds get their own northeast region and
that the remaining go to the opposition
(2017). This would effectively make divided
Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni enclaves.
While Syria has not formally been divided
the country has in some ways already
evolved into this layout. The Syrian
government has brokered “reconciliation”
deals, which usually occur after an
opposition area has been besieged to the
point of complacency with the humanitarian
issue becoming the extreme of a choice
between the deal or death. Through
“reconciliation” the regime along with its
allies offer the opposition, their families and
civilians “safe passage to rebel-controlled
Idlib or Jarabulus, in return for ceding the
besieged area to government forces” (Spyer,
2017).
This has become such common practice
within Syria that there is a Reconciliation
Affairs Minister, Ali Haidar, who claims
over one hundred towns/villages have
brokered such deals with the regime,
accounting for the displacement of over
three million Syrians internally to
Idlib/Jarabulus (Spyer, 2017). In fact, a
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reconciliation deal was just reached in Beit
Sahem-Babila-Yilda (on May 2, 2018) for
fifty buses and six ambulances to remove
seventeen thousand people. The report by
Syrian media is not a citable nor a reliable
source, however the wording explicitly
confirms the research in this paper as it
directly states, “the people of the towns are
to open a new page with the Syrian regime
and coexistence with the Shiite militias in
the area.”
As the Syrian regime continues to work with
its allies to regain control of key areas and to
remove the residents, it has become clear
that the demographic is changing. On April
2nd, 2018, law number ten issued by the
Syrian regime states,
This law authorizes the formation of new
local administrative units (governorates,
cities, and towns) tasked with registering
property ownership within their area of
jurisdiction. Private property owners are
then given thirty days to register and
provide proof of ownership. Failure to do
so will result in the property’s
confiscation by the state without
compensation. (Al-Shami, 2018).
This law would likely target those
opposition communities in which civilians
were displaced in “reconciliation deals,”
effectively making their displacement
permanent.
The statement made by Jonathan Spyer that
“Syria has ceased to exist” argues that the
country has reached a stalemate in which
neither the Syrian regime nor the opposition
rebels can likely succeed in victory. Instead
there has been a shift towards “arrangements
acknowledging the fragmentation of the
country” (2017). These fragments are along
the ethno-religious divides with which this
paper began.
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The future of the ongoing Syrian conflict is
unclear and there are many actors all with
their own agendas manipulating the pieces.
What is clear is that the political and
religious divide, which has yielded a
struggle for power, has caused a high
number of casualties. These casualties can
be measured by the number of Syrians
displaced from their homes within Syria, as
well as the number of Syrians who have fled
to refugee camps or other countries to seek
asylum. Additionally, there has been a high
number of casualties in life from both sides
with regime fighters and rebels alike being

killed. Even more disheartening is the large
number of civilian deaths, people who have
become caught in the crossfires of the
struggle for power.
It is also notable to mention the sheer
amount of infrastructure and property
damage that has occurred. No matter what
the result is of this conflict, there will be a
lot that needs to be rebuilt. This rebuilding
process will inevitably involve more than
just structural repairs but also the
reimagining of what the identity of Syria as
a country will be moving forward.

References
Al-Shami, L. (2018, April 23). Syria’s shock Doctrine. Aljumhuriya. Retrieved from
https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/content/syrias-shock-doctrine
Carpenter, T. (2013). Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications. Mediterranean Quarterly, 24(1), 111.
De Juan, A. and Bank, A. (2015, April 09). Peace and Conflict Management; Findings on Peace and Conflict
Management: The Ba’athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war.
Politics & Government Week, p. 304.
Eng, B. (2016). Struggling to Perform the State: The Politics of Bread in the Syrian Civil War. International
Political Sociology, 10(4), 130-147.
Fuller, G. (2007). The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance. The Washington Quarterly, 30(1),
139-150.
Ibrahim, A. (2017). Ending the Syrian Civil War: Is There a Federal Solution? Geopolitics, History and
International Relations, 9(2), 141-166.
Ismail, S. (2013). Urban Subalterns in the Arab Revolutions: Cairo and Damascus in Comparative Perspective.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 55(4), 865-894.
Medzihorsky, J., Popovic, M., & Jenne, E. (2017). Rhetoric of civil conflict management: United Nations Security
Council debates over the Syrian civil war. Research & Politics, 4(2).
Shaheen, K. (2017, November 13). Assad regime’s ‘starve or surrender’ strategy is a war crime, says Amnesty;
Report by human rights watchdog criticises the blocking of humanitarian aid at same time as carrying out bombing
campaigns. The Guardian (London, England), Nov 13, 2017.
Spyer, J. (2017, May 19). Syria has Effectively Ceased to Exist. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/19/syria-has-ceased-to-exist-rebels-airstrikes-isis-russia-iran/#
Syria Call. (Not a reputable source, but worth mentioning). Retrieved from https://nedaa-sy.com/en/news/5889

Published by Fisher Digital Publications, 2019

5

